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Abstract
In the context of resource allocation on the basis of responsive priorities, Ergin (2002) iden-
tifies a necessary and sufficient condition for the deferred acceptance rule to satisfy a consis-
tency principle. In this note we extend this result to the domain of substitutable priorities,
complementing results of Kojima and Manea (2010) and Kumano (2009).
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1 Introduction
In the context of resource allocation on the basis of responsive priorities, Ergin (2002) studies the
deferred acceptance rule (Gale and Shapley, 1962). He establishes that Pareto efficiency, group-
strategyproofness, and consistency are equivalent properties. Moreover, he identifies a necessary
and sufficient condition on the priority structure to guarantee that the deferred acceptance rule
satisfies any of these properties.
Kojima and Manea (2010) point out that in practice priorities may often be non-responsive
but substitutable. For the more general framework with substitutable priorities, Kojima and
Manea (2010) provide axiomatic characterizations of the deferred acceptance rule. In partic-
ular, they extend part of Ergin’s (2002) main result by showing that Pareto efficiency, group-
strategyproofness, and Maskin monotonicy are equivalent properties. Kumano (2009) comple-
ments these findings of Kojima and Manea (2010) by identifying a necessary and sufficient
condition on the priority structure to guarantee that the deferred acceptance rule is Pareto ef-
ficient when priorities are substitutable. The combined results of Kumano (2009) and Kojima
and Manea (2010) do not completely generalize Ergin’s (2002) main result since consistency of
the deferred acceptance rule is not dealt with. In this note we fill this gap.
2 Model
The notation and description of the deferred acceptance rule is due to Kojima and Manea (2010).
There is a set of agents N and a set of proper object types O. There is also a null object type,
denoted ∅. Each object a ∈ O ∪ {∅} has quota qa; q∅ = |N |. Each agent i is allocated exactly
one object in O ∪ {∅}. An allocation is a vector µ = (µi)i∈N assigning object µi ∈ O ∪ {∅} to
agent i. For each a ∈ O ∪ {∅}, we have that µa ≡ {i ∈ N : µi = a} satisfies |µa| ≤ qa.
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The preferences of each agent i over the set of objects is represented by a linear order Ri.
We denote by Pi the asymmetric part of Ri, i.e., aPib if only if aRib and a 6= b. An object a is
acceptable to agent i if aPi∅. Let R = (Ri)i∈N be the preference profile of all agents. For any
N ′ ⊂ N , we write RN ′ = (Ri)i∈N ′ .
We denote by A and R the sets of allocations and preference profiles, respectively. An
allocation rule ϕ : R→ A associates an allocation with each preference profile. At R, agent i is
assigned object ϕi(R), and object a is assigned to the set of agents ϕa(R).
An allocation µ Pareto dominates another allocation µ′ at R if µiRiµ
′
i for all i ∈ N and
µiPiµ
′
i for some i ∈ N . An allocation is Pareto efficient at R if no allocation Pareto dominates
it at R. An allocation rule ϕ is Pareto efficient if ϕ(R) is Pareto efficient at R for all R ∈ R.
An allocation rule ϕ is group strategy-proof if there exist no N ′ ⊆ N and R,R′ ∈ R such that
ϕi(R
′
N ′ , RN\N ′)Riϕi(R) for all i ∈ N
′ and ϕj(R
′
N ′ , RN\N ′)Pjϕj(R) for some j ∈ N
′.
A priority for a proper object a ∈ O is a correspondence Cha : 2
N → 2N with Cha(N
′) ⊆ N ′
and |Cha(N
′)| ≤ qa for all N
′ ⊆ N . We make the following two assumptions on each priority.
First, Cha is substitutable, i.e., for all N
′ ⊂ N ′′ ⊆ N , Cha(N
′′) ∩N ′ ⊆ Cha(N
′). Second, Cha
is acceptant, i.e., for all N ′ ⊆ N , |Cha(N
′)| = min(qa, |N
′|). Let Ch ≡ (Cha)a∈O denote the
(acceptant substitutable) priority structure.
An allocation µ is individually rational at R if for all i ∈ N , µiRi∅. The allocation µ is
blocked by a pair (i, a) ∈ N × O at (R,Ch) if aPiµi and i ∈ Cha(µa ∪ {i}). An allocation µ is
stable at (R,Ch) if it is individually rational at R and is not blocked by any pair (i, a) ∈ N ×O
at (R,Ch). Since Ch is substitutable, the so-called deferred acceptance rule, denoted ϕCh, yields
a stable allocation ϕCh(R) at (R,Ch) (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990, proof of Theorem 6.5). The
allocation ϕCh(R) is obtained through the deferred acceptance algorithm as follows.
Step 1: Each agent applies to his most preferred acceptable object under R (if any). Let N˜1a be
the set of agents applying to object a. Object a tentatively accepts the agents in N1a ≡ Cha(N˜
1
a ),
and rejects the agents in N˜1a\N
1
a .
Step t, t ≥ 2: Each agent who was rejected at step t−1 applies to his next preferred acceptable
object under R (if any). Let N˜ ta be the new set of agents applying to object a. Object a
tentatively accepts the agents in N ta ≡ Cha(N
t−1
a ∪ N˜
t
a), and rejects the agents in (N
t−1
a ∪
N˜ ta) \N
t
a.
The algorithm terminates when each agent is either tentatively accepted by some object or
has been rejected by every object that is acceptable to him. Each agent tentatively accepted
by a proper object at the last step is assigned that object, and all other agents are assigned the
null object. The allocation reached by the deferred acceptance rule is the agent-optimal stable
allocation at (R,Ch). That is, ϕCh(R) is stable at (R,Ch), and all agents weakly prefer ϕCh(R)
to any other stable allocation at (R,Ch) (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990, Theorem 6.8).
Since efficiency is one of the goals of the social planner in resource allocation problems,
Kojima and Manea (2010) develop necessary and sufficient conditions for the efficiency of the
deferred acceptance rules.
Proposition 1. (Kojima and Manea, 2010, Proposition 1)
The following properties are equivalent.
(i) ϕCh is Pareto efficient.
(ii) ϕCh satisfies Maskin monotonicity.1
(iii) ϕCh is group strategy-proof.
Kumano (2009) derives a generalization of the acyclicity condition introduced by Ergin (2002)
1For the definition of Maskin monotonicity we refer to Kojima and Manea (2010) and Maskin (1999).
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and shows that it is a sufficient and necessary condition on the priority structure to guarantee
that ϕCh satisfies either of the properties in Proposition 1.
A cycle is constituted of distinct i, j, k ∈ N and a, b ∈ O such that that there are disjoint
(and possibly empty) sets Na, Nb ⊆ N\{i, j, k} satisfying
(C) j 6∈ Cha(Na ∪ {i, j}), k 6∈ Cha(Na ∪ {j, k}), and i 6∈ Chb(Nb ∪ {k, i}).
(S) |Na| = qa − 1 and |Nb| = qb − 1.
If there is no cycle, then we say that the priority structure is acyclical.
Proposition 2. (Kumano, 2009, Proposition 1)
The following properties are equivalent.
(i) ϕCh is Pareto efficient.
(iv) Ch is acyclical.
Combining Propositions 1 and 2 yields a partial generalization of the main result of Er-
gin (2002, Theorem 1), who considers acceptant responsive priority structures (which are a strict
subclass of acceptant substitutable priority structures).2 The generalization of Ergin (2002, The-
orem 1) is not complete since Kojima and Manea (2010) and Kumano (2009) do not consider
the consistency of the (extended) deferred acceptance rule. In the next section we fill this gap.
3 Result
We first introduce consistency. Let Ch be a priority structure. An economy is a triple
(N ′, q′, RN ′) where N
′ ⊆ N and q′ ≡ (q′a)a∈O with q
′
a ≤ qa for all a ∈ O. The extended deferred
acceptance rule, denoted ϕ˜Ch, associates with each economy (N ′, q′, RN ′) the allocation that is
obtained by applying the (accordingly adapted) deferred acceptance algorithm to (N ′, q′, RN ′)
and the restricted priority structure (Cha|2N′ )a∈O
. Given the original economy (N, q,R), an
allocation µ for (N, q,R), and a subset of agents N ′ ⊂ N , the reduced economy of (N, q,R)
with respect to µ and N ′ is the economy (N ′, qµ, RN ′) where for all a ∈ O, q
µ
a ≡ qa − |µa\N
′|.
Consistency of the extended deferred acceptance rule requires that once an allocation for the
original economy is determined and some agents receive their assigned objects before the others,
the rule should not change the assigned objects of the remaining agents in the reduced economy.
Formally, a priority structure Ch induces a consistent extended deferred acceptance rule ϕ˜Ch if
for each N ′ ⊂ N and each preference profile R, µ|N ′ = ϕ˜
Ch(N ′, qµ, RN ′) where µ = ϕ˜
Ch(N, q,R).
The following result completes the generalization of Ergin’s (2002) main result.
Proposition 3. Each property in Propositions 1 and 2 is equivalent to the consistency of the
extended deferred acceptance rule ϕ˜Ch.
Proof. In view of (i)⇔ (iii) in Proposition 1, it is sufficient to prove that (i)⇒ ϕ˜Ch is consistent
⇒ (iii). The proof is an adaptation of Ergin’s (2002) proof.
(i) ⇒ ϕ˜Ch is consistent: Assume ϕ˜Ch is not consistent. Then there are N ′ ⊂ N and R such
that µ|N ′ 6= ϕ˜
Ch(N ′, qµ, RN ′) where µ = ϕ˜
Ch(N, q,R). Since µ = ϕ˜Ch(N, q,R) = ϕ(R) is a
stable allocation in the original economy (N, q,R), it immediately follows that µ|N ′ is stable in
the reduced economy (N ′, qµ, RN ′). Since priorities are substitutable it follows from Roth and
Sotomayor (1990, Theorem 6.8) that ϕ˜Ch(N ′, qµ, RN ′) Pareto dominates µ|N ′ in the reduced
economy (N ′, qµ, RN ′). Therefore, in the original economy, the allocation ν defined by
νi ≡
{
ϕ˜Chi (N
′, qµ, RN ′) if i ∈ N
′;
µi if i ∈ N\N
′
2A priority structure Ch is responsive if for each a ∈ O, there is a linear order Ra on N such that for each
N ′ ⊆ N , Cha(N
′) equals the set of min(qa, |N
′|) top ranked agents in N ′ under Ra.
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Pareto dominates µ. Hence, ϕCh is not Pareto efficient.
ϕ˜Ch is consistent ⇒ (iii): Assume ϕ˜Ch is consistent. From the proof of Lemma 1
in Pa´pai (2000) it follows that strategy-proofness and nonbossiness imply group strategy-
proofness.3 Since priorities are acceptant substitutable, it follows that for any object a ∈ O and
any two sets of agents N ′ ⊂ N ′′ ⊆ N , |Cha(N
′)| = min(qa, |N
′|) ≤ min(qa, |N
′′|) = |Cha(N
′′)|.
Therefore, the priorities satisfy the law of demand (Hatfield and Milgrom, 2005, page 923).
Hence, by Theorems 11 and 12 in Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), ϕCh is strategy-proof. To
complete the proof we show that ϕCh is nonbossy. Let i ∈ N and R,R′ ∈ R be such
that ϕChi (R) = ϕ
Ch
i (R
′
i, RN\{i}). Let µ ≡ ϕ
Ch(R) and ν ≡ ϕCh(R′i, RN\{i}). Note that
since µi = νi, the reduced economies (N\{i}, q
µ, RN\{i}) and (N\{i}, q
ν , RN\{i}) are the
same. Hence, ϕ˜Ch(N\{i}, qµ, RN\{i}) = ϕ˜
Ch(N\{i}, qν , RN\{i}). On the other hand, by
consistency, µ|N\{i} = ϕ˜
Ch(N\{i}, qµ, RN\{i}) and ν|N\{i} = ϕ˜
Ch(N\{i}, qν , RN\{i}). Hence,
µ|N\{i} = ν|N\{i}, which together with µi = νi implies that ϕ
Ch(R) = µ = ν = ϕCh(R′i, RN\{i}).
Hence, ϕCh is nonbossy.
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